This paper reviews the theoretical framework of Corporate Governance and multiple issues in which it is evaluated such as agency costs, asymmetric information, insider trading, manipulation of earnings, Board of Directors, etc. Finally, it is reviewed the impact of Corporate Governance over cost of equity, capital structure and financial performance.****
Introduction
To set up a unique definition to Corporate Governance could be a hard task. Different kinds of academic authors and institutions defined it into many ways.
Back in the 90ths, Cadbury Committee (1992) defined Corporate Governance as "the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board's actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting".
As per, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2004) defined it more recently as "procedures and processes according to which an organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization -such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders -and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making."
However, the main purpose of Corporate Governance is to prevent one group of shareholders from expropriating the cash flows and assets of one or more other groups. It is all about governing corporations in such a transparent manner that all stakeholders" interests are protected, and with due compliance with the laid down laws. (Bhardwaj and Raghavendra Rao, 2014) , so does corporate governance improve corporate performance? and it helps to reduce or mitigate the enterprise risks?.
Principles of Corporate Governance OECD Principles:
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance. The Principles focus on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-financial. 
CAF Principles:
The Corporation Andina de Fomento (CAF) (2013) also established 43 principles of Corporate Governance. They were divided among five chapters that are summary up in the following figure: 
Treasury Ethics and Corporate Governance
There are multiple situations in which Corporate Governance and daily trading in the capital market is evaluated and it has been review as many authors. For example, one main topic is the agency theory. Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) commented that is issue is very review due to two factors. First, it is an extremely simple theory, in which large corporations are reduced to two participants-managers and shareholders---and the interests of each are assumed to be both clear and con-sistent. Second, the notion of humans as self-interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice personal interests for the interests of others is both age old and widespread.
Also, it has been proven that by implementing corporate governance a company benefits economically. Another main topic on daily trading and corporate governance is asymmetric information. Corporate governance and systems for mitigating selfserving activities by company insiders receive considerable attention. One area of concern for regulators and the investing public is the risk and potential cost of buying or selling a stock when some traders have private information about the value of the firm. Informed trading includes trades by insiders plus trades by outsiders that are motivated by information superior to that of the public investor. (Jackson, Dutta and Nitani, 2008) .
In order to eliminate the asymmetric information risk, some countries has implemented several prevention measures. For example, in the UK, the LSE Model Code prevents corporate insiders from trading during a blackout period, which consists of the two months preceding final or interim earnings announcements and the month prior to quarterly earnings announcements. This rule imposes severe restrictions on the trading activity of corporate insiders, because it prohibits trading for six months of the year. It is thus an important question whether these trading restrictions are warranted. The rule is obviously based on the assumption that informational asymmetries are particularly large prior to earnings announcements. This situation varies according countries. On the other hand, in Germany, no blackout period exists. (Betzer and Theissen, 2009 ).
But, is not insider trading a benefit of employees inside a company? Is it part of their compensation? For Jackson et al. (2008) , CEOs are compensated explicitly, through cash payments and stock options, and implicitly, through perquisites and other indirect means. One component of implicit payment is insider trading Carlton and Fischel (1983) view insider trading as a possible element of an efficient contract between investors and management. Noe (1997) shows that contracting directly to ensure manager effort can be more costly than the use of insider trading.
Another main topic on daily trading and corporate governance is manipulation of earnings and financial results by one majority group of shareholders. Igan and Pinheiro (2010) investigate about this topic and found out several issues. First, the higher the proportion of shares owned by insiders, the smaller would be the analysts' optimism for forecasting. Additionally, their analysis suggests that institutional investors can profit because of earnings manipulation and may appear to anticipate the analysts' forecasting mistakes. This characteristic of our model implies a negative relation between institutional trading and the analysts' forecast errors. More precisely, institutional investors would take advantage of the "under-pricing" in the market induced by the low forecasts and buy stocks, selling for a higher price after the "positive" surprise. Empirically, this has two implications.
First, ownership of these investors increases when analysts exhibit pessimism. In other words, forecast errors are negatively correlated with trades ("frontrunning"). Second, institutional investors buy after the forecast, at a low price, and sell after a price increase exploiting the positive earnings surprise, so their trades correlate positively with contemporaneous returns ("positive feedback trading").
Once again, their empirical evidence supports both of these implications. Finally, in their model, the managers' ability to manipulate earnings is inversely related to the quality of corporate governance in the company. Managers of companies with better corporate governance are less likely to manipulate earnings. As a conclusion, their empirical results would be accentuated for poorly governed firms. We find strong supportive evidence for this hypothesis using an index of shareholder power and conclude that good governance can provide companies with the ability to circumvent some of the negative effects of stock-price-sensitive pay packages.
Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan (2013) summarized another issues about institutional shareholders. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that changes in institutional demand affect future prices, indicating that institutional investors possess information; however, their study does not address whether specific trading patterns incorporate information.
Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) find evidence to suggest that institutional investors possess better information, on average, and that security prices incorporate their information when they trade. In particular, they find the number of institutional traders plays an important role in determining quarterly returns, even though some of these traders are relatively small, supportive of our as well as and focus on the number of informed traders.
Finally, Jackson et al. (2008) indicated that with the shift to investing through mutual and pension funds, it is becoming more common to find outside investors who hold large blocks, but do not sit on the board of directors. Shleifer and Vishney (1986) predict that, all else equal, the presence of a large block-holder will have a positive effect on the market value of the firm. The potential takeover threat that large block-holders can exert works as an effective device for monitoring management.
What a. Cost of equity: In the theoretical assumption of no transaction or agency costs, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the cost of equity capital only depends only on the level of covariance risks of the world market portfolio and the country's risk. However, this not often true due transaction and agency costs. The empirical studies suggest that better corporate governance quality reduces a firm's cost of equity capital, which in turn enhances the firm's access to equity finance. This is probably because outsiders are likely to provide more finance and expect lower rates of return if they are given greater assurance (trough better governance) of a return on their investment. seems to be a growing disagreement amongst researchers on whether corporate governance components should be analysed together rather than separately. Whilst a majority of corporate governance literature centres on individual governance components, a recent literature is based on corporate governance index or rating, considering all related issues of corporate governance. Table 3 summarises the empirical studies on how individual governance components (e.g. ownership structures, shareholder rights, board and management diversity and disclosure quality) and overall governance standards (e.g. corporate governance index) are associated with the firm's valuation as well as operating performance." 
Conclusions
The paper outlined the theoretical framework of Corporate Governance. It is a review of literature. First it is presented a mix of definition about the topic and the OECD and CAF principles of application over firms. Then it is there multiple situations in which Corporate Governance is analyzed such as agency costs, asymmetric information, insider trading, manipulation of earnings, Board of Directors, etc.
Corporate governance generally refers to the mechanisms, processes and relationships by which companies are directed and controlled. This causes organizations to make better decisions, which in the medium term can be reflected in improved financial results, ie there is a value creation, so corporate governance helps to improve the corporate performance.
Besides, the governance structures benefit, because the government implemented called "corporate", helps to identify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the company (for example, the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors , regulators and other stakeholders) and includes the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs.
Another benefit of good corporate governance is to improve access to new capital (debt or equity). The better and more transparently an organization is managed, the more accountable the stewards of the company are for the allocation of capital and the generation of returns from it, the better it is able to raise capital at favorable or lower interest rates, so the corporate governance helps to mitigate the risk in the companies Finally, it is explained the impact of Corporate Governance over the cost of equity, capital structure and the financial performance of a firm.
